Abstract
The UK's reputation in Europe has been defined by its primary commitment to the USA and secondary involvement with the EU. Russia's relatively benign perceptions of the EU and the long-time Franco-German axis in the EU, which has looked favourably on Russia, as well as Russia's ultimate conclusion that the UK was not an effective interlocutor between the USA and itself, have all put pressure on the UKRussia relationship and highlighted the differences between EU member states' priorities. It is not the USA-factor alone, however. Long before the 'special' relationship with the USA, the UK and Russia had a history of troubled engagement with each other, both central players in the nineteenth century Concert of Europe, for instance. Even today, the relationship can be said to have foundered on their similar desires for power and influence, although equally on their differing methods. The most salient aspect of the US relationship is that the UK's much-diminished status is unquestionably brought into relief. Russia has so far refused to accept the same of its position.
The UK's objectives have remained constant throughout the period discussed here and are consistent with EU aims for Russia. They were summed up by the thenForeign Minister, Robin Cook, as: 'firstly, to secure democratic and stable society in Russia and, secondly, to secure a modern reformed market economy in Russia. '(1999) . It would be as fair to say in 2011 as Cook said then: 'We are still a long way from the latter and have some way to go on the former' (Cook, 1999) . The objectives are an indication of Britain's attunement to what Hague has called this 'networked world ' (2010) and notions of shared threat. Thus, through various bilateral and multilateral efforts, including but not limited to the EU, it has sought to engage Russia on issues such as the nuclear and environmental threats, crime, trafficking and terrorism. At a more directly self-interested level, Russia's resource-rich territory has proven a consistent lure for Britain's businesses. Thus officials refer persistently to the fact that Britain and Russia share threats, best managed through cooperation, the pre-requisite for which has remained the same: that Russia democratise and build a market economy based on respect for the rule of law. Ultimately, these objectives have been the source of conflict.
1992-2005 : engagement and accommodation
Russia's emergence as a state with which the West could do business was due in no small part to the intervention of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President, Ronald Reagan, setting the stage for the UK's preferred form of relations thereafter. In 1992, the new British Prime Minister, John Major, signed a treaty and economic cooperation agreement with Russia, established a joint trade and investment steering committee and expert credit guarantees. Major spoke also of the Board of Trade's support for the involvement of British companies in projects with and in Russia, including Rolls Royce (Major, 1992) . Thus, economic and trading relations were highest on the bilateral agenda.
By the time of a 1994 meeting, external events predominated. Major talked about the challenges Russia and the West were encountering, particularly the Bosnian War (as a result of Russia's close relations with the Serbs), nuclear non-proliferation and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. These would be issues that would later drive Russia further from the USA -and the UK. For the moment, the British themselves were not entirely unsympathetic to the Serbs and Major framed these very carefully as events external to the bilateral relationship and somewhat irrelevant: 'On foreign policy questions, there are no significant disagreements' (Major, 1994) .
Early on, exchanges between the two states were frequent and commonplace. From 1992 -1999 a number of FCO-defined (2000) 'high level' visits took place, an annual average of 7.6 outward visits to Russia and 10 inward; Yeltsin visited four times in eight years, British Prime Ministers the same (FCO, 2000) . By 1999, it was estimated the British Embassy received 80,000 visa applications in Moscow, compared to 3,000 in 1989 (in HoC, 1999 . There was also much diplomatic activity, British staffing levels in Russia were higher than those of France and not negligible compared even to Germany (FCO, 1999) . Other British activities ran parallel to the EU's assistance programme. The FCO identified the Department for International Development's Know How Fund (KHF) as a key facilitator, designed, like TACIS, to assist Russia make the transition to a market economy but focused also on ensuring positive effects trickled down to society. Funded by the KHF, young Russian managers trained in the UK to 'expose them to best Western business practice ' (FCO, 1999) . Under 'The programming 'in support of civic society, reform and democratisation ' (FCO, 1999) .
The activities of the KHF extended regionally to regions such as Sverdlovsk and Samara, thanks to the 'increasing regionalisation in Russia' (FCO, 1999) , something Putin's later 'verticalisation' would make more difficult.
Major's early hopes for British business opportunities in Russia were fulfilled in the period up to 1997, primarily for energy companies such as BP Amoco and British Gas but also Cadbury Schweppes. UK exports to Russia totalled £420.3 million in 1997 and rose to £712.6 million the following year, but dropping by 58% in 1999, following Russia's financial crash and devaluation of the rouble. Import figures rose from £459.0 million in 1997 to £763.4 million in 1999 £763.4 million in (FCO, 1999 . However, Russia's failure to stabilise its economy, the bureaucracy associated with doing business there and the lack of legal protections for foreign investors impacted negatively on the trading relationship. Russia would not be 'opponents' but 'partners', saying: '... we are facing each other across a bridge which we want to make sounder and wider' (Cook, 2002) . This bridge would narrow to tightrope proportions by 2008.
The deepening deterioration in relations that followed from 2003 stemmed from three factors: external pressures, leadership and British activity in Russia. To take the last of these first, throughout the 1990s, Britain made no secret of the fact that it sought to 'help' Russia in its transition to democracy and a market economy. Ultimately, Russia would tire of its role as pupil. Additionally, while Putin would undoubtedly still have targeted the British -as any foreign -presence in Russia, the pressure might not have been so intense if it had not been for the UK's alignment with the USA in respect of so many fault lines in Russia's Western relations. Leadership is also an important factor. Blair's desire to act as interlocutor between the USA and Russia put him in a position of being seen to choose between them and it was inevitable the US relationship would be privileged. Over Kosovo, NATO enlargement, the 2 nd Chechen
War, admittedly with a brief window for improvement following 9/11, but then the 2003 Iraq War, Britain stood again and again with the USA, even while speaking of the need to engage Russia. Ultimately, the position in the middle became untenable. It should be noted, however, that for the UK this was always a three-player game. The EU was not a primary consideration in the UK's Russia policy.
2006-2008: disappointment and diapprobriation
The shift into the second phase could be said to date back to 1999 with the Kosovo crisis, were it not for Cook's insistence that effective dialogue could still be had with MacKinlay, for example, spoke of the lack of parity that underpinned the request, saying: 'It is just untenable-unrealistic-to suggest that that can be justified and that somehow their law is different from ours in quality' (HoC, 2008) . Whatever the rights and wrongs, it is clear the British government could not take this perceived enormous breach of its sovereignty anything but seriously. Even if one accepts then-President
Putin's argument that this was not state-sponsored, the bilateral relationship was not helped by the bellicose stance Russia adopted and the airtime given to Lugovoi at home. It is important for the European elites to realize that Russia no longer needs anyone's instructions as to how it should, for example, conduct elections to be able to meet 'universal European values' and 'European democratic models,' or how to build its domestic and foreign policy. (Muradov, 2008: 82) British foreign policy discourse therefore only played a part in portraying Russia as 
Seeing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as tools for external interference in
Russia's sovereign affairs, the FSB has directly accused the British Embassy in Moscow of using NGOs to spy and diplomats there of engaging in espionage, a serious allegation that produced some comedic images in the British media of rocks being used to disguise surveillance equipment (HoC, 2007) .
Even under an ethical foreign policy agenda, trade is a fundamental part of what foreign policy is about, and this is particularly true for the British given their reliance on trade (Gaskarth, 2006: 337) . And, in the light of Russian actions, the EU should review -root and branch -our relationship with Russia. We should continue to strengthen the transatlantic relationship and may need to meet more regularly as the G7. We are also reflecting on the Nato response. We must re-evaluate the alliance's relationship with Russia, and intensify our support to Georgia and others who may face Russian aggression (Brown, 2008) .
Such conclusions were not indicative of what would follow, not least because of the change of US leadership, but also because it was recognised that it served no-one's interests to escalate tensions. In the event, the movement into a less tense phase reflected the House of Commons European Union Committee's conclusions that 'it is important to remain engaged with Russia but, as we stated in our previous report, that engagement must be hard-headed, pragmatic and unsentimental ' (HoC, 2009 ). This precisely mirrored the EU position, although, again, the EU was just one of a number of institutional arrangements to which the British referred.
2009-?: wary cooperation and pragmatic engagement
The movement into the third phase of UK-Russian relations mirrored events in the outside world and is summarised by an intention to continue to build relations with Medvedev's attempt to move the goalposts from the democratisation process to a modernisation agenda have led Brussels to comment that there is a societal dimension too.
Despite continuing problems, such as the February 2011 exclusion of Guardian journalist Luke Harding from Russia, the UK is standing firm with what is also the current EU message. Minister for Europe, David Lidington, has stressed that the best method of influencing Russian behaviour was to remind it that foreign investment is reliant on confidence that the rule of law is operated and basic freedoms observed (HoC, 2011) . Both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms are being applied, but once again the EU is no more privileged in the discourse than the Council of Europe, World Trade Organisation and even NGOs.
The Effect of UK-Russia Relations on the EU
The UK-Russia case shows that bilateral relations do not necessarily signal trouble for the EU. The UK has not uploaded its problems to Brussels and left it to resolve them, nor has it, to date, built a relationship with Russia that is antithetical to wider EU interests or the EU's own (less than well-developed) Russia policy. This does not mean that wider generalisations can be made. In respect of the former issue, not all member states have the diplomatic resources that Britain does and some are far more vulnerable to reliance on Russia than is the UK. However, it is perhaps time to acknowledge that the UK's relative lack of dependence on the EU can serve the EU's interests as well as those of the UK. For, had the UK used Brussels as the arena through which to express its invective, this could only have had a very damaging impact on the Brussels-Moscow relationship. As it was, the EU was able to express support and sympathy for the UK position (HoC, 2007) but did not have to let this define its own relations with Russia. Where other member states have left the EU to deal with the aftermath of their own poor relations with Russia, the UK case shows that bilateral relations can be the forum for the playing-out of antagonisms, insulating Brussels from their worst effects. At the same time, commitment to supporting wider European interests can be used as a defence to explain why certain forms of business are still undertaken. In sum, a two-level game is possible that accrues advantages to both levels.
There is one caveat to this otherwise positive message. Foreign policy is both a dynamic and a static field. One of the major obstacles to building fresh and good relations with another actor is memory of historically poor relations and the pathdependency that results. While the cases of Poland and Estonia seem to suggest EU membership can have a positive effect and cause states to (at least begin to) put history behind them, the UK case suggests that ad hoc events have the power to bring old perceptions and reactions back to the surface. The jury is still very much out on the question of whether Lisbon is evidence the EU states have seen the limitations of a Deutschian approach to community-building, and will rely instead on strong institutional structures to create new processes and understandings, institutional memories and more stable external relations.
